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VIETNAM STRESS SYNDROME AND THE
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
" began to wonder what they really had against Kurtz. It
wasn't just insanity and murder-there was enough of that to go
around for everybody."--Captain Willard in "Apocalypse
Now"
I. INTRODUCTION
A "new" defense to criminal actions has emerged in recent .years
which has been called Vietnam Stress Syndrome or Vietnam Stress Dis-
order. Its proper name is Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).' It is
not actually a defense in its own right; rather, it is a mental disorder
which may be considered a mitigating factor in sentencing, a ground for
a new trial or a basis for an insanity defense.
Most cases of Vietnam Stress Syndrome are not likely to qualify as
insanity under the "right or wrong" test of M'Naghten's Case2 and will
fare little better under the Irresistible Impulse3 and American Law Insti-
1. Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)-the proper name for Vietnam Stress Syn-
drome-is anything but new, even though it was not formally recognized until recently. See
infra note 14. Indeed, R.J. Daly identified a potential seventeenth century case of PTSD. He
postulated that Samuel Pepys' diary account of the Great Fire of London in 1666 chronicles
Pepys' development of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of the fire. See generally
Daly, Samuel Pepys and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 143 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 64 (1983).
See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
2. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 208, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). M'Naghten
was the first case to formulate a legal test for insanity. The M'Naghten test is based upon the
M'Naghten trial judges' answers to five questions posed by the House of Lords regarding crim-
inal responsibility. The judges responded:
"[To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of commiting the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong."
People v. Horn, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 1021' 205 tal. Rptr. 119, 123 (1984) (quoting
M'Naghten, 10 Clark & Fin. at 210, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722).
3. The Irresistible Impulse test extends the insanity defense to situations where the de-
fendant was incapable, by reason of mental disease or defect, of controlling his conduct. See,
e.g., Davis v. State, 161 Tenn. 23, 28 S.W.2d 993 (1930) (defendant incapable of controlling his
actions due to delusions held not guilty of second-degree murder although he knew right from
wrong). This test is generally used in conjunction with the M'Naghten test. See, e.g., Pierce v.
Turner, 402 F.2d 109 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 950 (1969); Commonwealth v.
McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967).
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tute (ALI) tests.4 Although PTSD cases may be more likely to qualify
for a Diminished Capacity defense,5 this defense is not recognized in all
states.6 A possible defense, which is related to diminished capacity, is
unconsciousness.7 However, it is questionable whether or not it may be
4. The ALI test codifies a combination of the M'Naghten and the Irresistible Impulse
tests. The ALI test provides:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social
conduct.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
5. Diminished capacity is the lack of mental capacity to form the necessary intent in a
specific intent crime. People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 336 P.2d 492, 499-500 (1959),
overruled by statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (West Supp. 1985). It differs from lack of specific
intent in that expert testimony may be introduced not only to show that the defendant did not
have the requisite intent at the time the crime was committed, but that the defendant could not
have the intent due to his mental condition. Id. Thus, the expert may testify about the defend-
ant's mental condition in general and his testimony is not limited to the defendant's mental
condition at the time of the crime.
6. For example, a 1982 California Ballot Initiative, Proposition 8, added § 25 to the Cali-
fornia Penal Code. Section 25 states, in pertinent part:
(a) The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal action, as
well as any juvenile court proceeding, evidence concerning an accused person's intox-
ication, trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect shall not be admissible to show or
negate capacity to form the particular purpose, intent, motive, malice aforethought,
knowledge, or other mental state required for the commission of the crime charged.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) (West Supp. 1985).
However, § 25 does not prevent a defendant from introducing evidence that he lacked the
required intent when a specific intent crime is charged. CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a) (West
Supp. 1985). See also CAL. ArrORNEY GENERAL'S OFFIcE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDE
TO PROPOSMON 8, at 8-2 to 8-4 (June 9, 1982).
7. The defense of unconsciousness, like insanity, deals with the issue of whether the de-
fendant is capable of committing a crime at all and, therefore, is a complete defense. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.01 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct
which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is
physically capable.
(2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this Section:
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or
determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
The defense of unconsciousness is also known as "automatism." Erlinder, Post-Trau-
matic Stress Disorder-Vietnam Veterans and the Law: A Challenge to Effective Representation,
1 BEHAV. SCi. & L., Summer 1983, at 25, 43; Howe, Psychiatric Evaluation of Offenders Who
Commit Crimes While Experiencing Dissociative States, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 255-56 n.10
(1984).
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used in conjunction with PTSD in jurisdictions which do not allow di-
minished capacity.'
PTSD's value as grounds for a new trial may also vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. Cases show that a defendant's failure to raise the
issue of Vietnam Stress Syndrome initially may preclude its being raised
at a later date,9 even though it was not recognized as a treatable disorder
until October 8, 1980.10 Further, the use of Vietnam Stress Syndrome as
a mitigating factor in sentencing may well depend on the personal feel-
ings of a judge or jury toward Vietnam veterans. 1
Additionally, PTSD is often thought of as a "novel" defense and,
therefore, not as credible as other more traditional defenses which have
the advantage of having been developed and tested over the years.12 Once
a court views a defense as a novelty, it is less likely to believe or even
admit evidence of that defense. It is, needless to say, quite difficult to
prove a defense with no evidence. PTSD is also easy to misuse as a de-
fense, precisely because it is so new and difficult to prove. 13
Although many of the same problems arise with the use of any
mental condition in a criminal proceeding, Vietnam Stress Syndrome has
several aspects which make it unique. This Comment will explore what
makes Vietnam Stress -Syndrome unique and why, or if, it should be
treated as such.
II. WHAT IS VIETNAM STRESS SYNDROME?
A. Diagnostic Criteria
Vietnam Stress Syndrome is the common name given to Post-trau-
matic Stress Disorder (PTSD) when suffered by veterans of the Vietnam
War as a result of their Vietnam experiences. 14 Post-traumatic Stress
8. Although California allows the defense of unconsciousness, in a California Vietnam
Stress Syndrome case which used this defense, the court analogized it to diminished capacity.
See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1970 &
Supp. 1985).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 171 & 179-84.
10. See infra note 14.
11. See infra notes 203 & 208-15 and accompanying text.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 118-19.
13. See generally infra text accompanying notes 24-33 & 228-31.
14. Prior to the recognition of PTSD as an actual mental disorder in October of 1980, THE
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM III], war veterans whose stress symptoms persisted
were considered to be suffering from some sort of neurotic or psychotic illness or from a per-
sonality disorder. This was the result of combat stress' prior classification as "gross stress
reaction," a condition which subsides as the situational stress subsides. Lipkin, Scurfield &
Blank, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Vietnam Veterans: Assessment in a Forensic Setting, I
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Disorder is a disorder which may be suffered following a traumatic event
which is outside the normal realm of human experiences. These events
may be such things as rape, assault, military combat, natural disasters or
deliberate man-made disasters such as torture, bombing and death
camps. These events are known as "stressors."'1 Stressors of human ori-
gin, such as war and military combat, produce more severe and longer
lasting disorders than do natural disasters. 6
The symptoms of PTSD are many and varied. Perhaps the best
known symptom is the re-experiencing of the traumatic event, which can
occur either through recollections of the event, recurrent dreams of the
event or a sudden acting out or feeling that the traumatic event is actu-
ally occurring at the moment. This last possibility is known as a "disso-
ciative state" and is the rarest symptom of PTSD, occurring only in
extreme cases.1 7 Dreams and recollections ,are far more common. 18
Numbing of responsiveness to, or involvement in, the outside world is
another symptom of PTSD. The person is no longer interested in things
he once was and may experience a change of values. 9 Additional symp-
toms include: hyperalertness or exaggerated startle response; sleep dis-
turbances; guilt about the person's own survival or about the tactics
which the person used in order to survive; memory impairment and diffi-
culty concentrating; and avoidance of activities which may cause the per-
son to recall the stressful event.2" Any and all symptoms may also be
intensified by exposure to events which resemble the stressor.2 ' This be-
comes particularly important in terms of the dissociative state and crimi-
nal behavior.22 Other problems associated with PTSD, which become
significant when viewed in the context of criminal behavior, are the per-
son's tendency toward increased irritability, impulsive behavior and un-
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 51, 52 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Lipkin] (citing THE AM. PSYCHIATRIC
Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968) [here-
inafter cited as DSM II]). A persistent failure to adjust following the stressful situation indi-
cated a more severe underlying disturbance. Id. (citing DSM II, supra). The inability to
reconcile recognized diganoses with the stress reactions of Vietnam veterans influenced the
development of DSM III, supra. Id. at 53.
15. DSM III, supra note 14, at 236.
16. Id.
17. Id. See also Wil~on & Ziegelbaum, The Vietnam Veteran on Trial- The Relation of
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to Criminal Behavior, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 69, 71 ("[Tlhe re-
experiencing of the traumatic episode is the sine qua non [an indispensable requisite] of
PTSD.").
18. DSM III, supra note 14, at 236.
19. Id. at 238.
20. Id. at 236-37.
21. Id.
22. Wilson & Ziegelbaum, supra note 17, at 71, 73-74.
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predictable explosions of aggression with little or no provocation.23
B. Problems of Misdiagnosis
In a legal context, being aware of PTSD is not enough; the problem
is to prove or disprove its existence. The symptoms of PTSD are the
same or similar to those of many other disorders, and consequently,
PTSD is often misdiagnosed.24  PTSD is a newly recognized disorder
about which relatively little is known. It requires particular expertise to
diagnose and treat and the fact that someone is a psychiatrist or psychol-
ogist does not necessarily qualify him to deal with the disorder.25 Most
people experienced in dealing with PTSD, especially as applied to Viet-
nam veterans, are working in conjunction with the Veterans Administra-
tion. Yet these experienced professionals may not qualify as "experts" in
the legal sense, while those who have never dealt with the disorder may
qualify.26 Consequently, PTSD may be misdiagnosed as an anxiety or
depressive disorder,27 an antisocial personality disorder,2" schizophre-
23. DSM III, supra note 14, at 238.
24. Aside from the diagnostic problems inherent in PTSD itself, see infra notes 27-31 and
accompanying text, prior to 1980 the disorder was not formally recognized by the American
Psychiatric Association. See supra note 14. As a psychiatrist or psychologist may only diag-
nose a condition or disorder which has been recongized by the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, a proper diagnosis prior to 1980 was virtually
impossible.
25. Walker & Cavenar, Vietnam Veterans, Their Problems Continue, 170 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 174, 176 (1982) ("the differential diagnosis for PTSD in combat veterans is
one of the most challenging tasks of modem psychiatry").
26. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or edu-
cation, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
This would seem to indicate that a psychiatrist or psychologist must have training and
experience with PTSD in order to testify. It also would appear that a person who is neither a
psychiatrist nor a psychologist could testify as an expert if he had training and expertise in the
area. Yet, neither is necessarily true. Generally, any psychiatrist may qualify as an expert on
mental disorders, and a non-psychiatrist or psychologist may not qualify, regardless of his
experience with the particular disorder in question. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying
text.
27. PTSD has symptoms of depression and anxiety which may be sufficiently severe to be
diagnosed as either of these disorders. DSM III, supra note 14, at 237; Atkinson, Henderson,
Sparr & Deale, Assessment of Viet Nam Veterans for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Veterans
Administration Disability Claims, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1118, 1120 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Atkins~n & Henderson].
28. Walker, Viet Nam Combat Veterans with Legal Difficulties: A Psychiatric Problem?,
138 AM. . PSYCHIATRY 1384, 1385 (1981) ("Because of the combat veteran's hostile attitude,
tendency to have difficulty with authority figures, history of drug and alcohol abuse, and fre-
quent difficulty with the law, the erroneous diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder is often
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nia29 or an hysterical neurosis. 30 Additionally, alcohol and drug abuse,
common in PTSD sufferers, may mask PTSD symptoms and make the
diagnosis even more difficult.
31
The problems of misdiagnosis arise in two situations: (1) the person
may be diagnosed as suffering from another condition when in fact he is
suffering from PTSD;32 or (2) the person may be diagnosed as suffering
from PTSD when in fact he is suffering from another condition or even
none at all.13 Both of these possibilities present very real problems in a
legal context.
III. PTSD AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
Statistics indicate that incidents of PTSD among Vietnam veterans
are far more prevalent than is generally assumed. Estimates indicate that
from thirty to seventy percent of all Vietnam veterans experience
PTSD.34 Other estimates indicate that 29,000 Vietnam veterans are in
federal prison,35 approximately 37,500 are on parole, 250,000 are on pro-
bation and 87,000 are awaiting trial.36 Some believe that as many as
twenty-five percent of all men in prison are Vietnam era veterans.37 Yet,
despite the national tragedy these statistics indicate, studies regarding the
relationship between PTSD and criminal behavior are still very limited.
One two-year study conducted by John P. Wilson, Ph.D., and Shel-
don D. Zigelbaum, M.D., does assess the relationship between certain
made."); Walker & Cavenar, supra note 25, at 176; Atkinson & Henderson, supra note 27, at
1120.
29. Walker & Cavenar, supra note 25, at 175-76 ("Psychotic-like states characterized by
violent outbursts, paranoid ideation, and chaotic behavior can be confused with schizophrenia
30. Id. at 175 ("dissociative reactions of individuals suffering from PTSD may simulate an
atypical psychosis (hysterical neurosis)"); Atkinson & Henderson, supra note 27, at 1120.
31. Walker & Cavenar, supra note 25, at 176 ("Alcoholism and drug abuse may mask
PTSD. Reports indicate that at least 30 per cent of combat veterans have difficulty with alco-
holism .... ").
32. See generally infra notes 157-65 & 177-84 and accompanying text.
33. See generally infra notes 228-35 and accompanying text.
34. Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 17, at 70 (citing A. EGENDORF, C. KADUSHIN & R.
LAUFER, LEGACIES OF VIETNAM: COMPARATIVE ADJUsTMENT OF VETERANS AND PEERS
(1981)).
35. Walker, supra note 28, at 1384 (citing STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON VETERANS AF-
FAIRS, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM ON VIETNAM ERA
VETERANS (Comm. Print 1979)).
36. Walker, supra note 28, at 1384 (citing President's Message to Congress, Vietnam Era
Veterans, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1737-42 (Oct. 10, 1978)).
37. State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 377 (La. 1982). See infra notes 97-109 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of this case.
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aspects of PTSD and criminal behavior.3 8 Wilson ancd Zigelbaum have
broken down the types of PTSD suffered by Vietnam veterans into nine
separate syndromes.3 9 These are: (1) Depression and Suicidal Syn-
drome;' (2) Isolation and Withdrawal Syndrome;41 (3) Sensation Seek-
ing Syndrome;42 (4) Paranoid State Syndrome;43 (5) Profound Psychic
Numbing Syndrome; 4" (6) Alienation and Cynicism Syndrome;
45
(7) Problem of Intimacy Syndrome;46 (8) Fusion of Stress Syndrome with
Pre-morbid Disposition Syndrome;47 and (9) Prosocial-Humanitarian
Syndrome.48
Several studies indicate that varying factors in the individual and in
their Vietnam experiences account for the different types of stress re-
sponse.49 Likewise, the type of response the individual manifests affects
38. Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 17.
39. Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 17, at 72-73.
40. With this syndrome, the person feels helpless, depressed, hopeless and dejected. He
may also manifest other classical signs of depression such as sleeping problems. Id. at 72.
41. The person prefers to live alone and away from others. He tends to seek a self-con-
tained lifestyle and may maintain the hyperaltertness which he developed in Vietnam. Id.
42. The person only feels happy and fulfilled when engaged in thrill seeking. He is gener-
ally an "action junkie" and may also develop addictive disorders. Id.
43. The person is angry, suspicious and hostile. He has an explosive rage and often feels
exploited or persecuted by the government. He is overly suspicious of authority and power
and may maintain a hyperaltertness similar to that he used in Vietnam. Id.
44. The person feels like a "walking shell" of his former self. His basic capacity for hope is
extremely diminished and he may experience catastrophic anxiety or manifest a blank, "zom-
bie-like" stare. Id.
45. With this syndrome the person becomes cynical about "the system" in general (i.e. the
law, the government and authority figures). Although the person is generally moral and ethi-
cal, he tends to seek an anti-system perspective in his moral reasoning. Id.
46. Despite this person's strong need for intimacy, he has strained interpersonal relations
due to a fear of loss of love objects. He may react to fear or stress by either flight or explosive
fits. Id.
47. This person already had an underlying psychiatric disorder which has fused with the
PTSD. This may cause a paranoid state which can become predominant and mask the PTSD
or it may manifest itself in typical hysterical symptoms such as fugue (dissociative) states or
amnesia. Id.
48. This is the healthiest reaction to PTSD. The person transforms his survivor guilt and
other symptoms into an altrustic and nurturing orientation. Id. at 73.
49. It appears that the level of combat is the critical variable in the development of PTSD.
The more combat the veteran experienced, the higher the chances of developing PTSD. Frye
& Stockton, Discriminant Analysis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among a Group of Viet
Nam Veterans, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 52, 52 (1982); Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 17, at
70. Others believe it is not the exposure to combat itself, but rather the individual's subjective
perception of combat which is determinative. Three factors have been identified: the individ-
ual's perception of realistic dangers or fears; the subjective distortion of those dangers or anxie-
ties; and threats to the protective mechanisms used to cope with real or perceived dangers.
Hendin, Pollinger, Singer & Ulman, Meanings of Combat and the Development of Posttrau-
matic Stress Disorder, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1490, 1490 [hereinafter cited as Hendin].
Other factors have been determined to be relevant to the development of PTSD. One is
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:473
whether or not he is likely to engage in criminal behavior.5 0 Wilson and
Zigelbaum hypothesize that PTSD is linked to criminal behavior through
the "survivor mode" of psychological functioning." The survivor mode
is characterized by an altered state of consciousness, hyperalertness,
hypervigilence and the use of survivor skills learned in combat in Viet-
nam. 2 This internal reaction may be manifested as a dissociative reac-
tion, a Sensation Seeking Syndrome or a Depression-Suicide Syndrome.5 3
The dissociative reaction is often associated with violent crimes and as-
saultive behavior. 4 The Sensation Seeking Syndrome is more likely to be
associated with non-violent crimes, 5 and the Depression-Suicide Syn-
drome is likely to lead to poorly planned and poorly executed crimes.
5 6
the helpfulness of the veteran's family upon his return. The more the veteran was able to share
his experiences, the less likely he was to develop PTSD. Frye & Stockton, supra, at 55. See
also Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 17, at 70. Another factor is whether the veteran was
discharged immediately upon completing his service in Vietnam or whether he had some per-
iod of transition before his return home. A transition period was found to be very helpful in
helping the veteran cope and, therefore, lessened his chances of developing PTSD. Frye &
Stockton, supra, at 55; Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 17, at 70. A third factor is the amount
of exposure to the specific stressors, injury, death and destruction in Vietnam. Again, the
higher the exposure, the greater the chance of developing PTSD. Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra
note 17, at 70-71. Fourth, the veteran's own personal locus of control has been found to be
relevant. Those whose locus of control was external rather than internal had higher incidents
of PTSD. Frye & Stockton, supra, at 56.
50. Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 17, at 73-75. See infra text accompanying notes 51-
59.
51. Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 17, at 80.
52. Id. at 73.
53. Id. at 73-75.
54. Id. at 73. If an individual is placed in a threatening situation, he is likely to experience
a dissociative reaction in which he may behave as he did in combat in Vietnam. Id.
55. Id. at 74. In this situation the veteran is compulsively repeating life or death en-
counters. United States v. Tindall, Cr. No. 79-376 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 1980), involved a de-
fendant who exhibited this type of behavior. Tindall successfully raised a defense of PTSD to
drug smuggling charges based on the theory that he was re-enacting combat missions. For a
discussion of this and other cases in which defendants successfully raised PTSD as a defense,
see Erlinder, supra note 7; Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder-Opening Pandora's Box?, 17
NEw ENG. L. REv. 91 (1981).
However, a possible exception to the nonviolent theory is the case of Richard Ford, an ex-
Los Angeles police officer presently awaiting trial on charges of murder for hire, attempted
murder, conspiracy and armed robbery. Prior to his arrest, Ford was seeking treatment for
PTSD through the Veterans Administration. Ford has been quoted by others who were in
treatment with him as describing his life with the police department as "the same kind of
excitement that 'Nam brought on, the rush, you know ... your life is on the line." L.A.
Times, Sept. 26, 1983, § IV, at 1. Certainly Ford appears to fit Wilson and Zibelbaum's de-
scription of a "thrill seeker." See supra note 42. Yet he stands charged, not with a nonviolent
crime such as Tindall's, but with the most violent of all-murder.
56. Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 17, at 75. The authors theorize three possible motiva-
tions behind this behavior: first, an attempt on the part of the veteran to get killed or attack
and vent rage at the perceived source of his anguish; second, a means of getting caught and
VIETNAM STRESS SYNDROME
The Wilson and Zigelbaum study examined the relationship be-
tween exposure to specific stressors in Vietnam and particular types of
criminal behavior. Significant correlations were found between: (1) the
number of weeks in combat and manslaughter; (2) the number of combat
roles the veteran performed and disorderly conduct, assault and weapons
charges; (3) subjective stress in combat roles and driving under the influ-
ence, disorderly conduct, assault and weapons charges; and (4) exposure
to stressors indigenous to combat in Vietnam and disorderly conduct,
assault, weapons charges, and breaking and entering.57 However, no cor-
relation was found between specific combat roles, pre-morbid personality
disorders5" or the veterans' homecoming experiences and criminal
behavior.59
Additionally, the seven types of stress responses-depression, physi-
cal symptoms, sensation seeking, anger/rage, intrusive imagery, aliena-
tion and intimacy conflict-were correlated with criminal conduct."
Assault was significantly correlated with physical symptoms, alienation,
anger/rage, intrusive imagery and intimacy conflict.6 1 Correlations were
also found between weapons charges, physical symptons and intimacy
conflict.
62
Finally, the study examined which PTSD factors are predictors of
specific criminal behavior. Depression, intimacy conflict and alienation/
stigmatization are predictive of disorderly conduct; intrusive imagery is
predictive of driving under the influence; and intimacy conflict and de-
pression are predictive of assault.63
Wilson and Zigelbaum concluded that there is a significant relation-
ship between the amount of combat and its stressfulness to the veteran,
and criminal conduct characterized by hostility towards others. 64 They
hypothesize, therefore, that the criminal conduct is a form of "acting
thereby receiving help; and third, an unconscious re-enactment of the original trauma. The
authors note that this third possibility is also seen in victims of the Nazi persecution. Id.
57. Id. at 78.
58. The pre-morbid personality is the personality which a mentally ill person had prior to
the actual mental illness. A pre-morbid personality disorder, thus, is any signs or symptoms,
not rising to the level of an actual illness or disorder, which the person exhibited prior to the
point when the illness or disorder was diagnosible as such.
59. Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 17, at 78-79. It seems then that the factors which
contribute to the development of PTSD do not necessarily also contribute to criminal behav-
ior, as some factors which correlate to PTSD do not correlate to specific criminal conduct. See
supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
60. Id. at 79 (Table 3), 80. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
61. Wilson & Zigelbaum, supra note 17, at 80.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 79 (Table 3).
64. Id. at 81.
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out" either emotional problems or some aspect of the original trauma.65
However, as interesting as these findings may be, they are the results
of one limited study which used only 114 veterans. Of the veterans stud-
ied, only twenty-four were convicted of driving under the influence,
twenty-two of disorderly conduct, eleven of assault, twelve of weapons
charges, nineteen of breaking and entering, fourteen of theft and fifteen of
drug charges. Additionally, the study does not indicate how many of the
114 veterans were convicted of more than one crime nor which crimes
constitute the overlap.6 6 It is interesting to note that no significant corre-
lations were found between specific stressors or specific PTSD factors
and theft or drug charges, 67 and only one significant correlation was
found between breaking and entering and a specific stressor.68 However,
the correlations which were found were to more violent crimes, which
may be significant in itself.
IV. EXISTING LAW AND PTSD
There are currently three primary uses for PTSD in the context of
criminal proceedings. It may be the basis for a defense, grounds for a
new trial or a mitigating factor in sentencing.
A. PTSD as a Defense
PTSD may be used either as an insanity defense or as a related de-
fense, such as diminished capacity or unconsciousness. There are cur-
rently two major tests in use in the United States for determining
whether a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity.69 The strictest is
the "right-wrong" test of M'Naghten's Case.7" Under M'Naghten, a de-
65. Id.
66. The breakdown of specific crimes in which Wilson and Zigelbaum found correlations
totals 127. The initial breakdown of convictions, which includes crimes in which no correla-
tions were found, indicates a total of 111 veterans. Id. at 78. Thus, there is an obvious overlap
of 16 convictions. However, the study does not address any correlations between multiple
crimes and PTSD factors which were found to be significant.
67. Id. at 79.
68. Id.
69. A third, the Durham test, also known as the "product test," was adopted in Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), and excuses conduct which is the "product of
mental disease." Id. at 876. Most states found this test to be unworkable and it has been
abandoned by all jurisdictions except New Hampshire. Note, The Proposed Federal Insanity
Defense: Should the Quality of Mercy Suffer for the Sake of Safety?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 49,
54 (1984).
70. See supra note 2. Twenty states currently follow the M'Naghten test: California, Colo-
rado, Delaware, Louisiana, Minnesota and South Dakota have adopted it by statute; Arizona,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Washington and Wisconsin have adopted it
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fendant pleading insanity based on PTSD would have to show either that
he did not understand his actions were wrong or that he did not under-
stand the nature and quality of his act.7 If the defendant were suffering
from a very severe case of PTSD which included dissociative states or
flashbacks, he might be able to plead insanity in a M'Naghten jurisdic-
tion. If his crime were one of violence, such as murder or assault, and he
indeed believed that he was in combat in Vietnam, then it could reason-
ably be concluded that he did not know his actions were wrong as he
believed he was attacking or killing the enemy.72 If, however, he suffered
only from the myriad of other symptoms, such as impulsive and aggres-
sive behavior or psychic numbing (any or all of which might lead to acts
of violence and be totally beyond his control), the M'Naghten test would
provide him no defense.
The second test for insanity,73 the American Law Institute (ALI)
test,74 probably provides a defense for at least a few more sufferers of
PTSD. Because the ALI test includes a volitional prong, the veteran
who is unable to control his actions as a result of PTSD would be able to
assert an insanity defense, even though he knows what he is doing and
that it is wrong. Thus, the veteran whose symptoms of impulsive/aggres-
sive behavior oi psychic numbing lead to criminal conduct would be in a
better position to raise an insanity defense in an ALI jurisdiction.
Another defense based on mental condition, diminished capacity,
75
is not actually an insanity defense. This defense alleges that the defend-
ant did not have the capacity to form the intent necessary to be guilty of
through case law. Note, supra note 69, 52-53 n.24; People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 704 P.2d
752, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1985).
71. People v. Horn, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 1021, 205 Cal. Rptr. 119, 123 (1984).
72. It is debatable whether it could be said under these circumstances that the veteran did
not know the nature and quality of his act. Certainly, if he believed he were killing the enemy,
then he knew that what he was doing was killing a human being.
73. The ALI and the Irresistible Impulse tests will be treated as one test for purposes of
this Comment, as those states which use the Irresistable Impulse test do so in conjunction with
the M'Naghten test, which produces essentially the same result. Note, supra note 69, at 53.
M'Naghten is a cognitive test, while the Irresistible Impulse test is volitional. The ALI test
includes both a cognitive prong and a volitional prong. See supra note 4 for text of ALI test.
74. See supra note 4. Six states have added the Irresistible Impulse test: Georgia has
added it by statute, while Alabama, Michigan, New Mexico, Virginia and Wyoming have
adopted it through case law. Twenty-one states have adopted some form of the ALI test.
Fourteen states have codified some form of it: Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illi-
nois, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin.
Interestingly, Wisconsin offers its defendants a choice of tests. Seven states have adopted it
through case law: Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee and
West Virginia. Additionally, all of the federal circuits, except the First Circuit, have adopted
some form of the ALI test. Note, supra note 69, at 53 & n.27.
75. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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a specific intent crime.76 However, unlike an insanity defense, a finding of
diminished capacity does not necessarily negate criminal liability. If the
charge encompasses lesser included offenses, the defendant may still be
found guilty of a crime.77 This defense may well encompass more aspects
of PTSD than any other. Under a defense of diminished capacity a de-
fendant could argue that any of the symptoms of PTSD affected his be-
havior. For instance, the psychic numbing, or change in values, which
might also induce criminal behavior, could be used to show that the de-
fendant's behavior truly was affected by a mental disorder.
A defense which is somewhat related to diminished capacity is that
of unconciousness. 78 Under this defense, the defendant alleges that he
was not conscious of his actions. In the case of a defense of unconscious-
ness based on PTSD, the assertion is essentially that the unawareness was
caused by the defendant's mental condition. This is a particularly invit-
ing defense for PTSD defendants because it is not an insanity defense
and, if successful, it results in complete acquittal.79 Thus, the defendant
avoids both the stigma of an insanity defense and confinement in a
mental institution.8" However, not all PTSD defendants are in a position
to assert this defense. In order for the defendant to have been legally
unconscious in a PTSD context, he would have to have been in a fugue or
dissociative state.
Additionally, it is unclear whether this use of the unconsciousness
defense would be accepted in a state which does not allow diminished
76. A specific intent crime includes in its definition some intent on the part of the defend-
ant which must be proven in order for the defendant to be found guilty; e.g., the common law
crime of larceny requires the intent to steal. If the defendant only intended to borrow the item
he is charged with stealing, he is not guilty of larceny, even though he was fully aware that the
item was not his and he intended to take it. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 417-18 (5th ed. 1977).
77. Many specific intent crimes have lesser included offenses which require only "general
criminal intent." General intent is the intent to do the act which the law declares to be a
crime. It does not matter whether the person intended to commit a crime. People v. Zerillo,
36 Cal. 2d 222, 232, 223 P.2d 223, 230 (1950).
78. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
79. The Model Penal Code states that a person is not guilty of a crime unless the act was
voluntary. An act which is done without the actor's conscious knowledge is not voluntary.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01; see supra note 7. California Penal Code § 26 states in relevant
part: "All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following
classes: ... Four-Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1970 & Supp. 1985). Thus, like insanity, this defense com-
pletely exculpates the defendant. It is not that his responsibility is lessened, but rather that he
never committed a crime at all.
80. Although it is true that the defendant will not be confined to a mental institution if his
defense of unconsciousness is successful, it is also unfortunately true that the court will not be
able to insure that the veteran will receive any treatment at all.
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capacity. In People v. Lisnow,81 the Appellate Department of the Los
Angeles Superior Court rejected the prosecution's argument that a de-
fense of unconsciousness could not be based on a mental condition, rea-
soning that the difference between unconsciousness and diminished
capacity was merely one of degree.82 The court stated that, while dimin-
ished capacity negates specific intent, unconsciousness negates the capac-
ity to commit any crime at all.83 Thus, before a defense of
unconsciousness based upon PTSD can be raised, it appears that the ju-
risdiction must first accept some theory of diminished responsibility
based upon a mental condition short of insanity.84
B. PTSD as Grounds for a New Trial
A second possible use of PTSD by the criminal defendant is as
grounds for a new trial. If the defendant were convicted prior to his
condition being diagnosed as PTSD, he may be able to argue that the
recent diagnosis of his condition as PTSD constitutes new evidence. Of
course, a motion for a new trial based on new evidence has certain re-
quirements. The new evidence must go to the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence and the evidence must be genuinely new.8 It is the requirement
that the evidence be "new" that causes the most difficulty in PTSD
81. 88 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 21, 151 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1978). Lisnow raised a defense of
unconsciousness based on PTSD to a charge of battery. He asserted that his criminal conduct
occurred while he was in "a fugue (or dissociative) state brought on by the continuing trau-
matic neurosis from which [he] suffered due, in large part, to his combat experience [in Viet-
nam]." Id. at 23, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 622. Lisnow is interesting in that the defendant
successfully asserted a PTSD defense before PTSD was recognized as a disorder. See supra
note 14.
82. Lisnow was decided prior to Proposition 8, which abolished the defense of diminished
capacity in California. See supra note 6.
83. Lisnow, 88 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 26, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 624. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
84. A state that does not allow a diminished capacity defense may also prohibit any type of
mental incapacity defense short of insanity. For example, California Penal Code § 25(a) states
in pertinent part:
In a criminal action, as well as any juvenile court proceeding, evidence concerning an
accused person's intoxication, trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect shall not be
admissible to show or negate capacity to form the particular purpose, intent, motive,
malice aforethought, knowledge, or other mental state required for the commission
of the crime charged.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) (West Supp. 1985).
85. Under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence will not ordinarily be granted unless the defendant can
show that the evidence was unknown or unavailable at the time of trial, that the failure to learn
of the evidence was not due to a lack of diligence, that the evidence is material and that the
new evidence will probably result in acquittal upon retrial. United States v. Slutsky, 514 F.2d
1222, 1225 (2d Cir. 1975) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 33).
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cases.86 If, at the time of trial, the defendant knew that he had a problem
at the time he committed the offense, even though he did not realize it
was PTSD, the evidence is technically not "new."817 Additionally, the
requirement that the evidence go to the defendant's guilt or innocence
means that the PTSD must be sufficiently severe to be used as a defense.
Thus, once again the defendant's success in asserting PTSD will depend
upon the jurisdiction.
C. PTSD as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing
PTSD may also be taken into consideration as a mitigating factor in
sentencing. This means that the court may reduce the sentence, place the
defendant on probation or impose an alternative sentence. Thus, even if
the defendant's condition does not constitute legal insanity, the court is
not totally prohibited from considering the effect of the defendant's
mental condition.8" The problem in this area is the limited ability of the
court to do anything other than reduce the defendant's sentence. A
court could order the defendant to receive treatment as a condition of
probation, 9 but if the defendant is sentenced to time in prison, the court
is no longer in a position to order treatment. Once in the prison system,
the veteran suffering from PTSD is left with the same possibilities for
treatment, or lack thereof, as any other prisoner with a mental
condition.9"
86. See infra text accompanying notes 155-56.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 164 & 181-84.
88. Even states which follow strict standards for insanity or other defenses allow evidence
of a mental condition for purposes of sentencing. For example, California Penal Code § 25(c)
provides that evidence of diminished capacity or of a mental disorder may be considered by the
court only at the time of sentencing or other disposition or commitment. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 25(c) (West Supp. 1985).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). Section 3651 permits the court to impose probation and
suspend the sentence in the interest of justice and gives the court authority and discretion to
impose terms and conditions of probation:
The court may require a person as conditions of probation to reside in or partici-
pate in the program of a residential community treatment center, or both, for all or
part of the period of probation: Provided, That the Attorney General certifies that
adequate treatment facilities, personnel, and programs are available.
Id.
90. All jurisdictions provide procedures whereby mentally ill prisoners may receive treat-
ment or be transferred to mental institutions if necessary. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1982).
Generally, however, there are insufficient treatment facilities available for the number of pris-
oners who require them. NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH ASS'N, MYTHS & REALITIES: A REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 27 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT].
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V. APPLICATION OF EXISTING LAW TO PTSD-THE CASES
An examination of several cases in which the defendant alleged
PTSD reveals that PTSD may not be as useful to an accused as has been
thought. Judges and juries are not quick to accept the validity of
PTSD,9 1 courts do not accept PTSD as "new" evidence,92 and its value
in sentencing appears to depend more upon the crime than the defend-
ant's condition.9 3
A. PTSD as a Defense
Juries have had difficulty accepting the credibility of a defendant's
story that he believed he was in Vietnam when he committed the crime94
or that he does not recall the circumstances surrounding the crime with
which he is charged.95 Nor is a defendant's claim that his criminal ac-
tions are not in keeping with his normal behavior and personality often
believed.96
One case in which the defendant alleged that he was in a dissociative
state is State v. Felde.97 In 1979, Felde escaped from the prison where he
was serving a twelve-year prison term for assault and manslaughter.98
While an escapee, he was arrested for public intoxication and shot a po-
lice officer who was transporting him following the arrest.99 At trial,
Felde pleaded insanity and introduced evidence that he was suffering
from PTSD.1 ° The evidence demonstrated that he had been in the midst
91. See generally infra text accompanying notes 110-14 & 125-35.
92. See generally infra text accompanying notes 164 & 181-84.
93. See generally infra text accompanying notes 216-20.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 100-03 & 112-14.
95. See infra note 99 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 166-67.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 149-52 & 157-60.
97. 422 So. 2d 370 (La. 1982).
98. Evidence was introduced during cross-examination which implied that Felde was in a
dissociative state at the time he committed the first homicide for which he was convicted and
serving time at the time of his escape. Felde shot a friend in the head and put the victim in a
bedroom closet. Id. at 381. Felde told his mother to "wipe his tears" and said "'I think
there's a man in there that was shot in the head. I think I killed him.'" Id. at 381 n.ll.
99. Felde was arrested as a simple drunk when a taxi driver refused to carry him.
Although the police had been told that Felde had a gun, they did not find it when they
searched him. While they were transporting him, Felde was discovered leaning forward to-
wards the driver's seat. The police officer simultaneously hit the brakes and pushed Felde
backwards. The gun went off. Felde said that he was trying to shoot himself and did not
remember anything after the first shot. Three more shots were fired and the officer staggered
out of the car and collapsed dead in a ditch. Felde ran slowly away from the scene but was
found nearby, still handcuffed and armed. Id. at 375-76. See infra text accompanying note
108.
100. The court appointed three psychiatrists to examine Felde after he entered a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity. All three testified that Felde was sane at the time of the shooting.
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of a dissociative state and that he believed he had been captured by the
North Vietnamese at the time he shot the police officer. 10, The jury was
so moved by the evidence presented by. the defense that it issued a sepa-
rate statement recognizing the contribution of Vietnam veterans and
pledging support and assistance. 10 2 However, the jury was unable to find
Felde legally insane under the rule in M'Naghten's Case1" 3 and, at Felde's
own urging,' °4 sentenced him to death." 5 Felde's sentence was affirmed
However, the defense also called three psychiatrists, all of whom testified that Felde suffered
from PTSD and was suicidal. Felde, 422 So. 2d at 378. Felde also introduced lay testimony
concerning the changes in his behavior following his return from Vietnam. The evidence
showed that Felde had been a "happy-go-lucky kid" prior to serving in Vietnam, but was
moody, irritable, depressed, and suffered from sleeping and alcohol problems after his return.
Both Felde's mother and his sister had attempted to get him psychiatric help after he returned
from Vietnam. Id. at 376-77.
101. Id. at 378. One psychologist testified that Felde was trying to kill himself, not the
police officer, when the first shot was fired. He testified that Felde told him "'I saw flashes,
flashes like incoming rounds hits, like firecrackers, hearing machine guns, I heard machine
guns, I heard rifle fire, I heard more explosions and I couldn't move. I was happy because I
knew I was going to die.'" Id.
102. The statement read:
"We, the Jury, recognize the contribution of our Viet Nam veterans and those
who lost their lives in Viet Nam.
"We feel that the trial of Wayne Felde has brought to the forefront those ex-
treme stress disorders prevalent among thousands of our veterans.
"We have attempted, through great emotional and mental strain, to serve and
preserve the judicial branch of our government by serving on this Jury.
"This trial forever will remain indelibly imprinted upon our minds, hearts, and
consciences.
"Through long and careful deliberation, through exposure to all evidence, we
felt that Mr. Felde was aware of right and wrong when Mr. Thomkins' life was
taken. However, we pledge ourselves to contribute whatever we can to best meet the
needs of our veterans."
Id. at 380 n.9.
103. Louisiana follows a modified version of the M'Naghten rule; and, the burden of proof
is on the defendant to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. NAT'L MENTAL
HEALTH ASS'N, MYTHS & REALITIES: HEARING TRANSCRIPT OF THE NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 43, exhibit 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as HEARING
TRANSCRIPT].
104. At the penalty phase of the trial, both Felde and his counsel urged the jury to impose
the death penalty. In response to his counsel's questions regarding his ability to control his
conduct in the future, Felde testified:
I'think other deaths will result.... [Tihat's why I suggested it [the death penalty], to
prevent it from happening. They would be on your conscience if you can't return it.
Now I'm not trying to put you all in a bad position but you all are taking other
people's lives in your hands, along with mine, so I think you should return it.
Felde, 422 So. 2d at 394. In closing argument, Felde, acting as his own co-counsel, stated: "A
walking time bomb, that's what it is. Somebody else will die as a result of it if I'm not put to
death, I am sure. It's happened twice in eight years.... I think as countrymen, you owe me
that much. I did my part. Please do yours. Okay?" Felde, 422 So. 2d at 394.
105. Id. at 375. Pursuant to Louisiana statute, the jury found the fact that the victim was a
peace officer engaged in his lawful duties to be an aggravating circumstance. Id. (citing LA.
CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(b) (West 1984)).
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by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
°10 6
It appears that neither the trial court nor the Louisiana Supreme
Court disbelieved the existence of PTSD or that Felde suffered from it.
Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the evidence of PTSD
was "very persuasive.1"7 Rather, Felde's PTSD was insufficient to meet
the legal test of insanity. Felde himself testified that the dissociative reac-
tion did not begin until after he had pulled the gun on the police officer
and the first shot, which was accidental, was fired.108 Thus, it appears
the jury was left with a dilemma: If Felde was sane when he first pulled a
gun on the officer, would his subsequent dissociative state during the
events which followed excuse the killing? The jury said no, and the
supreme court held that a rational juror could have found that Felde was
not insane and that Felde had the specific intent to kill or harm the
officer. 109
A prime example of reluctance to recognize the validity of PTSD is
illustrated by the case of Miller v. State.'"° In Miller, the defendant es-
caped from a work farm facility in South Dakota after learning that he
was to be transferred back to the prison where he had been previously
assaulted and injured. 1 Miller was found four days later in Wisconsin.
At trial he testified that from the time of his escape until he was
back in custody, he believed he was in Vietnam and that everywhere he
looked he saw Vietnamese people. His only intention in running was to
"[g]et back to the States." Miller recalled hiding in a "Buddha shrine"
for several days, running across a "rice patty field" and being shot at.
Then, suddenly, he was talking to two police officers in Wisconsin.' 12
Although Miller testified to all this and had entered a formal plea of
insanity which was never withdrawn, his own counsel refused to actively
pursue the defense and the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the
mental illness defense." 3 Miller was convicted and the South Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed." 4
106. Felde, 422 So. 2d at 398.
107. Id. at 380.
108. Id. at 390.
109. Id. at 393. For further information concerning this case, see Magee, Viet-Vet Syn-
drome: The Long War of Wayne Felde, NATION, Jan. 2-9, 1982, at 11.
110. 338 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1983).
111. Id. at 674; Miller v. State, 313 N.W.2d 460, 461 (1981). Miller was serving a 25 year
sentence for second-degree rape and assault with a dangerous weapon for the rape and beating
of a Rapid City, South Dakota woman. Miller v. State, 344 N.W.2d 78, 79 (S.D. 1984).
112. Miller, 338 N.W.2d at 680 (Henderson, J., dissenting). In reality Miller had been hid-
ing in the Cathedral Church in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Id.
113. Id. at 676-78. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
114. Miller, 338 N.W.2d at 678.
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Miller appealed on several grounds, two of which are relevant here:
first, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his attorney's
failure to actively pursue his insanity plea;"1 5 and second, that he was
denied both a fair and impartial jury trial and due process of law by the
trial court's failure to read his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to
the jury.
116
The South Dakota Supreme Court held that although Miller had
formally entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, he had "aban-
doned" the insanity defense prior to trial and, therefore, the trial court
had not erred. 1 7 The court also found that the failure of counsel to pur-
sue an insanity defense based on PTSD did not constitute a denial of
effective assistance of counsel in that "a lawyer is not required to...
pursue novel theories of defense" '18 and that, "[w]hile mental illness is
an established defense, clearly this 'Vietnam Stress Syndrome' is a novel
theory of defense." 19
The South Dakota Supreme Court merely echoed the sentiments of
the post-conviction hearing judge in this case. The post-conviction judge
refused to recognize Vietnam Stress Syndrome as a mental illness
factor. 120
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Henderson took exception to both
115. Id. at 677. Miller's lack of success on appeal as to this issue was partially due to the
fact that he had himself appointed as co-counsel at trial despite the trial court's warnings
regarding the dangers of taking that action. Id. at 676 & n.2.
116. Id. at 675. This action was for post-conviction relief; Miller did not raise the issue of
his insanity defense having been ignored on direct appeal. In his initial appeal, Miller alleged
that his escape was justified because he feared he would be attacked again by the other prison-
ers. Miller v. State, 313 N.W.2d 460, 461 (S.D. 1981). His failure to raise the PTSD issue
initially may have hurt his claim. The court noted in his initial appeal, that even though he
testified at trial regarding his flashback to Vietnam, his claim on appeal was that his escape was
justified. Id. Thus, by the time Miller finially did raise the issue of the trial court ignoring his
PTSD defense, the South Dakota Supreme Court had previously heard him argue that he
escaped because he was in fear for his life from the other inmates. This, however, should not
have affected the court's decision; alternate theories are always acceptable on appeal. 9 J.
MOORE, B. WARD. & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 228.02 (2d ed. 1985) (All
issues must be raised and briefed in order for court to consider them).
117. 338 N.W.2d at 676. The court did not believe that the heart of Miller's defense was
insanity, but rather, justification, as much of the testimony supported a justification theory.
There was evidence that Miller's attorney decided not to pursue the insanity defense after he
received the psychiatrist's report. However, there was also evidence that the attorney did not
seek another opinion nor attempt to obtain Miller's records or Veterans Administration
records. Id. at 677-78.
118. Id. at 678 (quoting United States v. Baynes, 687 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1982)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 682 (Henderson, J., dissenting). The post-conviction judge's Conclusion of Law
Number 5 stated: "The entire record as presented to this court fails to present a sufficient
evidentiary basis to support a mental illness defense." Id.
Dec. 1985] VIETNAM STRESS SYNDROME
the hearing judge's and the majority's attitude toward the use of PTSD as
a defense, stating: "I cannot countenance the courts of this state refusing
to recognize the Vietnam stress syndrome as a mental illness. . . . It
appears that the reviewing judge's mind was closed to the very defense
that permeated the trial." 2 ' He concluded that as the defendant had
presented much evidence concerning his disorder, the court's refusal to
give appropriate jury instructions did indeed deprive Miller of a fair
trial. 122
Although his trial was held in 1980, and as the Supreme Court of
South Dakota pointed out, PTSD was a "novel theory of defense" at that
time, 123 it was not as "novel" when the appeal was heard in 1983, three
years after the American Psychiatric Association formally recognized the
disorder. 124 The Supreme Court of South Dakota appears to believe that
a man's guilt or innocence can be determined by the timing of his trial.
The defendant in United States v. Crosby1 25 encountered a different
problem in attempting to introduce his evidence of PTSD at trial.
Crosby was convicted of kidnapping and assault with a deadly weapon
after he entered a Veterans Administration hospital with a shotgun and
took four people hostage. 126 Crosby had been undergoing treatment for
PTSD for some time and at trial he claimed that he had been in a "disso-
ciative" state at the time of the incident.
1 27
Crosby sought to have his counselor from the Veterans Outreach
121. Id. (Henderson, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 683 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 678.
124. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
125. 713 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1983).
126. Id. at 1069-70. Crosby was charged with one count of kidnapping in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) and four counts of assault with intent to commit a felony in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 113(b). Id. at 1069 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(b), 1201(a)(2) (1978)).
127. Id. at 1069-70. The government's expert testified that Crosby's problems were the
result of an "'anti-social' personality" and drug abuse, and "that he detected nothing in his
examination to indicate that Crosby was suffering from PTSD." Id. It is interesting to note
that anti-social behavior is a symptom of PTSD. DSM III, supra note 14, at 238. See infra
note 227 and accompanying text.
Crosby introduced much evidence that he was suffering from PTSD. Crosby's wife,
mother, brother and friends testified to the changes in his behavior following his return from
Vietnam. Two counselors from the Veterans Outreach Center testified as lay witnesses and
several psychiatrists also testified. Id. at 1072, 1077. Many of the witnesses testified to things
they had read in a journal kept by Crosby, which contained accounts of nightmares and flash-
backs from as early as 1971. Id. at 1072. Despite the quantity of evidence relating to PTSD
generally, it appears that Crosby introduced very little evidence specifically concerning the
dissociative state. He testified that he had become disoriented and depressed the day before the
hostage incident after he read a newspaper account of a Vietnam veteran who had committed
suicide. He recalled drinking and taking drugs with a friend, and not sleeping all night, but
did not recall how he got home that evening. Id. at 1076.
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Center, a storefront counseling service under the auspices of the Veterans
Administration, qualified as an expert on PTSD. The trial court refused
to qualify the counselor but did, however, permit him to testify to his
observations as a lay witness.
128
On appeal, Crosby objected to the trial court's failure to qualify his
counselor as an expert when it had qualified a doctor of osteopathy who
had no board certification in psychiatry. The Fifth Circuit upheld the
trial court's decision that only a physician could qualify as a diagnostic
expert of PTSD. 129 The court also noted that the defendant had four
psychiatrists testify as experts and that the counselors from the Outreach
Center were permitted to refresh their memories from the counseling
center records.1 30  No reason was given for qualifying the doctor of
osteopathy. 131
It is not clear, however, that the court's failure to qualify the Out-
reach Center counselors as experts was prejudicial in this case. Other
evidence introduced at trial indicated that Crosby's actions were well
planned. This evidence showed that on the morning of the incident he
drove to a friend's house and borrowed the shotgun. He then drove to
the hospital, parked in, the back and left the shotgun in the car. He
walked around the building to the main entrance, through the main
lobby, past the nurse's station, and exited the building by the ambulance
parking area where he had left his car. Moments later he reentered the
building with the shotgun. 132 Although Crosby introduced much evi-
dence that he did indeed suffer from PTSD, very little evidence was of-
fered to support his claim that he had been in a dissociative state.
133
Thus, his defense was rejected and he was convicted.1 34 The Fifth Cir-
128. Id. at 1077 n. 11. A lay witness may not testify to his opinions except as to those which
are rationally based on his perceptions (i.e., the speed a car was traveling) or those which are
necessary and helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony. FED. R. EvID. 701.
129. Crosby, 713 F.2d at 1077. The court noted that the inherent difficulty in accurately
diagnosing PTSD and the availability of psychiatric testimony justified the trial court's refusal
to qualify the Veterans Outreach Center counselor as an expert. Id. See supra notes 25-26 and
accompanying text.
130. Crosby, 713 F.2d at 1077, 1073. On appeal, the defendant also objected to the exclu-
sion of the counselling center records. The Fifth Circuit upheld their exclusion on the grounds
that they were essentially cumulative of other testimony and that their exclusion did not preju-
dice the defendant. Id. at 1072-73.
131. Id. at 1076-77.
132. Id. at 1069. The prosecution also offered evidence, which was refuted, that Crosby had
told a friend "I am going to blow some people's heads off at the Veterans Administration
Hospital." Id. at 1074-75.
133. See supra note 127.
134. Crosby, 713 F.2d at 1070. Crosby was sentenced to 10 years for kidnapping, to three
concurrent five year terms on three of the assault charges and to one five year sentence on the
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cuit affirmed. 135
In contrast to Crosby, the defendant in State v. Sharp1 36 did not
encounter great obstacles in presenting an insanity defense based on
PTSD. He did, however, fail to prove that he was legally insane at the
time. 137 Sharp was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for the
murders of his aunt and uncle.
138
Sharp had gone to visit his wife, who had moved in with her brother
and sister-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. Bobinger (Mrs. Bobinger was also the
defendant's aunt), because she was no longer able to live with Sharp and
his uncontrollable fits of rage. 139 While he was visiting, he pulled out a
knife and laid it next to him on the sofa. Mr. Bobinger then asked him to
leave because Sharp's wife was afraid. Sharp refused and became violent.
In the scene that followed he stabbed to death both his aunt and her
husband and wbunded his nephew."
Sharp pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity based upon PTSD.
The defense experts categorized the defendant's condition as "an uncon-
trollable sort of 'rage reaction'" during which he was incapable of know-
ing right from wrong.' 4 ' One psychiatrist testified that Sharp had
"'resorted to survival tactics,' "142 and a counselor from the Veterans
Administration testified to conversations with Sharp concerning Sharp's
battle experiences. 43 However, the state's expert characterized the de-
fendant as having an "'explosive personality disorder'" which worsened
fourth assault charge. The five year sentences were suspended on the condition that he be
placed on probation following his release after serving the 10 year sentence. Id.
135. Id. at 1080.
136. 418 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1982).
137. Id. at 1347. Louisiana follows the M'Naghten test for insanity and places the burden
of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on the defendant. Id. at 1347 n.7; HEARING
TRANSCRIPT, supra note 103, at 43, exhibit 1.
138. Sharp, 418 So. 2d at 1347.
139. Id. at 1346. Sharp's wife testified that generally Sharp's behavior was normal, but that
after "brooding" he would fly into a rage and beat her. Id. at 1347 n.6.
140. Id. at 1346. The nephew managed to run out of the house and escape further injury.
When the nephew ran, the defendant also fled. The defendant's wife had run to another room
and managed to escape injury entirely. Id.
141. Id. at 1347.
142. Id. This theory is not inconsistent with studies concerning the connection between
criminal behavior and PTSD. The "survivor mode" is often associated with criminal behavior.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-56. However, two of the defense experts also testified
that Sharp was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Sharp, 418 So. 2d at 1347.
143. Id. at 1347 n.4. The court permitted the counselor to testify as an expert in social
work specializing in counseling veterans who suffered from emotional problems. Id. But see
United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1076 n.10 (1983) (court refused to qualify outreach
center counselor as expert in social work on ground that sociology "had no significant rele-
vance to the issues at trial."). See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
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after his tour in Vietnam. 1" Sharp was convicted of first-degree murder
and sentenced to life in prison.145 The Louisiana Supreme Court af-
firmed, stating that the evidence was in conflict and a jury could reason-
ably have returned a verdict of either guilty or not guilty by reason of
insanity.
146
The cases of Crosby and Sharp illustrate quite clearly that PTSD in
and of itself is not a defense. It is plain that both defendants had very
real symptoms of PTSD.147 Both Crosby and Sharp had been undergo-
ing treatment. 148 Yet, in the eyes of the law, PTSD is nothing more than
a mental condition which may or may not have sufficient legal signifi-
cance to be of any benefit in a criminal defense.
In some cases, the defendants suddenly and inexplicably embarked
on a pattern of behavior which was totally foreign to their usual selves.
Yet, the fact that this behavior was so out of keeping with the defend-
ants' backgrounds was of little help in convincing the judges and juries
that the defendants had bona fide mental disorders.
One of the more dramatic cases is State v. Cone.49 The defendant in
Cone had entered college following his service in Vietnam and graduated
with honors in three years. He was accepted into law school, having
scored in the ninety-sixth percentile on the admissions test. However,
after college, Cone was convicted of three separate armed robberies and
spent five years in prison. Following his release from prison, he robbed a
jewelry store and shot a citizen and a police officer in the chase that
followed. The next day, while still trying to evade the police, he beat an
elderly couple to death because they "ceased to cooperate with him [in
that they] became frightened [which] was not what he wanted them to
do." 150 Cone's defense of insanity based on PTSD was rejected151 and he
144. Id. at 1347. He testified that the defendant confined his "temper displays" to his wife
and family. The state's doctor also testified that Sharp was not schizophrenic and knew the
difference between right and wrong at the time of the crime. Id.
145. Id. at 1345, 1347.
146. Id. at 1348-49. The court also noted that "[t]he record left little doubt that this young
conscript infantry soldier was indelibly scarred psychologically by his confrontations with
death and destruction," but that the question before the jury was whether the "psychological
scars" left him unable to distinguish right from wrong 10 years later. Id. at 1346.
147. Crosby's nightmares, flashbacks and alienation are all PTSD symptoms, as is Sharp's
aggressive, explosive behavior. DSM III, supra note 14, at 238; see supra text accompanying
notes 17-20.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 127 & 143.
149. 665 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1984).
150. Id. at 91. Cone never denied the killings, but rather denied much recollection of the
incident. He claimed he remembered only that he wanted to get cleaned up and fed so he
could escape when his victims became frightened. Id.
151. It appears that the only evidence offered to support Cone's PTSD claim was his failure
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was convicted and sentenced to death. 152
The court does not appear to have noticed that it is rather unusual
for a man who was an honor student and accepted into law school, to
suddenly have changed to a life of drugs and crime which culminated in
the brutal beating and murder of an elderly couple. Additionally, the
court does not appear to have believed either that the defendant used
drugs excessively or that he suffered from PTSD 5 One cannot help but
wonder just what the jury and the court thought prompted the defend-
ant's bizarre change in behavior.
154
B. PTSD as Grounds for a New Trial
Defendants have been surprisingly unsuccessful in using PTSD as
grounds for a new trial when they were convicted prior to 1980 or when
doctors failed to diagnose PTSD at the time of trial. Even though PTSD
was not formally recognized until 1980, the court may not consider evi-
dence of PTSD to be "new" if the defendant was ever treated for a
mental problem in the past. This is true even if the disorder was previ-
ously misdiagnosed or if the new evidence relates to a different disorder
or condition. 5 On the other hand, if the defendant was never treated
for a mental disorder in the past and is now diagnosed as suffering from
PTSD, he may face a different problem. The court may consider the
to remember and his drug use. Cone's experts testified that Cone was suffering from PTSD
and " 'chronic amphetamine psychosis' as a result of serious drug abuse." Id. at 92. However,
several lay witnesses testified that he did not appear to be seriously under the influence of drugs
or experiencing withdrawl when they saw him in the days prior to the time the crimes were
committed. Id. One police officer testified that there were no needle marks or other exterior
signs of drug abuse on Cone's body. Id. at 91. The court placed great emphasis on the lack of
objective verification of Cone's druge use and on the fact that he had not been seen by his
expert witnesses until a few weeks prior to trial. Id. at 90. However, amphetamines can be
taken either orally or intravenously and the symptoms of amphetamine intoxication are not the
same as other forms of narcotic intoxication such as heroin intoxication. See generally DSM
III, supra note 14, at 147-50.
152. Cone, 665 S.W.2d at 89-90.
153. See supra note 151. While PTSD and drug abuse are often found together, drug abuse
may mask the PTSD as many of the symptoms are similar. See supra note 31 and accompany-
ing text.
154. Apparently the court believed that Cone was a sociopath. This is not an unreasonable
belief under the facts of the case, standing alone. But the fact that Cone was once an honor
student makes the validity of this conclusion questionable. A person with an antisocial person-
ality disorder, or sociopath, see infra note 227, first experiences the disorder before age fifteen.
In males, the first symptoms usually appear in early childhood, and interfere with educational
achievement. DSM III, supra note 14, at 317-21. While it is true that those suffering from
PTSD may be misdiagnosed as being socipaths, it is also true that PTSD may bring about a
change of values and anti-social behavior. DSM III, supra note 14, at 236-38; see supra text
accompanying note 19; see infra note 227 and accompanying text.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 164 & 181-84.
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issue of an insanity defense to have been waived if it was not raised at
trial." 6 This interesting legal "catch 22" severely limits the use of PTSD
as grounds for a new trial.
The case of United States v. Stone 5 7 is similar to Cone with respect
to the dramatic change in the defendant's behavior. Stone was a highly
decorated Vietnam veteran and an airborne instructor in the Army with
the rank of sergeant. While serving in Vietnam, he was treated for "com-
bat fatigue" and sent back to the United States where he continued to
serve in the Army. 5 In 1971, a year after his return from Vietnam,
Stone was convicted of kidnapping, assault with a deadly weapon, assault
with intent to commit rape, disabling and maiming, aggravated sodomy
and rape'59 for the brutal abduction and rape of a local elementary
school teacher."6
Stone asserted an insanity defense based on "combat fatigue," but
was unsuccessful.' 61 On appeal, the court held that the jury was war-
ranted in finding that Stone did not meet the legal test of insanity, and
156. See infra text accompanying note 171.
157. 472 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1020 (1980).
158. Stone served two tours in Vietnam and was wounded both times. Hospitalization was
not required either time and both times he was immediately returned to combat duty. In 1970,
he was treated for combat fatigue after a battle in which he was the sole survivor. He was
evacuated to a hospital following an incident at a field hospital in which he became hysterical
and began threatening people with a loaded weapon. At a military hospital in Japan, he was
diagnosed as "depressive reaction, chronic." Stone v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 250, 251 (1984).
He was released to return to duty with the restrictions that he be stationed in the United
States, that he not be assigned to an isolated area and that he not be reassigned to combat.
Following his release, the diagnosis was changed in his records to "'[r]eaction, psychoneur-
otic, dissociative type, acute, severe, manifested by sudden hysterical behavior, a sudden
dimunition [sic] of contact with reality, sudden threatening of violence which probably was in
response to hallucinating that enemy were all about him....'" Id. at 252. His impairment
was listed as " '[m]ild for further military duty; minimal for social and industrial adaptation.'"
Id.
159. As the crimes were committed at Fort Benning, the defendant was charged under 18
U.S.C. § 13 (1982), which provides for the adoption of state law for areas which are under
exclusive or concurrent federal jurisdiction. 472 F.2d at 910 & n.1.
160. The victim was married to a lieutenant who was stationed at Fort Bening. Stone
initially attacked her in her home but dragged her out of the house to his car after a neighbor,
who had heard her scream, came to see if she was all right. He then took her to a deserted
road where he repeatedly raped, sodomized, and beat her, and burned her with lighted ciga-
rettes and the car's cigarette lighter. In the morning he released her after telling her that he
had recently returned from Vietnam. 472 F.2d at 911-12.
161. It is unclear what Stone relied upon to support his insanity defense; however, members
of his family testified to his irrational behavior following his return from Vietnam and several
soldiers testified that Stone had behaved irrationally while in Vietnam. Id. at 912. There is no
indication that Stone claimed to have been in a dissociative state or that he could not recall the
attack. Additionally, following his arrest, Stone waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1968), and signed a confession. Id.
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upheld the conviction.' 62 In 1981, Stone requested a new trial based on a
recent diagnosis of PTSD but was unsuccessful. 6 The claims court
stated that Stone had been aware of the "new" evidence because his mili-
tary records established that he had been mentally ill and that his motion
amounted to another direct appeal on the matter of his guilt or inno-
cence. " Thus, the fact that he had not been diagnosed as suffering from
PTSD was irrelevant. The court appears to believe that one mental ill-
ness is as good as another in an insanity defense, regardless of the fact
that all mental illnesses do not have aspects sufficient to constitute legal
insanity.
An interesting sidelight to the Stone case is that the Army was suffi-
ciently impressed with him and his service record to grant him an honor-
able discharge following his conviction.' 5
In State v. Serrato,'66 the defendant faced the opposite problem
when he requested a new trial based on a recent diagnosis of PTSD. His
failure to plead insanity initially precluded him from introducing evi-
dence of PTSD under the newly discovered evidence doctrine. The facts
of the case, as found by the trial court, are that Serrato was a helicopter
pilot who was going on a short trip with his daughter. He decided to
return to his house to request that his wife join them, but when he did,
she became angry. Serrato's next recollection was of himself sitting on
the bed next to h:r body. He then returned to his car where his daughter
was still waiting and resumed his trip.'6 7 Serrato did not plead insanity
at his trial as he had no realization at that time that he was possibly
suffering from PTSD.' 68 Serrato's questionable confession 169 was intro-
162. Stone, 472 F.2d at 913, 917.
163. Stone v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 250, 257 (1984). Stone filed a motion titled "Motion
for New Trial and Complaint for Benefits and Allowances" alleging newly-discovered evidence
of PTSD. He also attempted to receive disability retirement pay based on PTSD, and made
two attempts to receive back pay for the time he was in prison prior to his discharge, alleging
that his absence was unavoidable because it was the result of a service related condition. None
of his claims were successful. The Veterans Administration determined that Stone had a per-
sonality disorder or nervous condition. Stone v. United States, 4 CL. Ct. 250, 256; see also
Stone v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 604, 618 F.2d 119 (1979); Stone v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct.
264 (1984) (action to recover reenlistment bonuses recouped by United States). The motion
was denied as being untimely in Stone v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 292-78 (Order, March 12,
1982). The back pay and benefits aspects were denied in Stone v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 264
(1984).
164. Stone, 4 Cl. Ct. 250, 257 (citing Stone v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 292-78 (Order,
March 12, 1982)).
165. Stone, 4 Cl. Ct. 250, 256 (1984).
166. 424 So. 2d 214 (La. 1982).
167. Id. at 216.
168. Id. at 222-23. The crime occurred in October of 1980. Serrato was first examined by a
psychiatrist in November, 1980 and then again in January, 1981. Id. at 216, 223. PTSD was
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duced at trial and he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison with-
out benefit of parole, probation or suspension.
170
The trial court had denied Serrato's motion for a new trial on the
grounds that: (1) as he had not plead not guilty by reason of insanity
initially, the new evidence would not be admissible; (2) the defendant had
not been diligent in discovering the new evidence; and (3) it did not ap-
pear that the psychiatric testimony would change the verdict. 171 In sup-
port of this last reason, the court noted that one doctor testified that the
defendant did know right from wrong immediately before he killed his
wife because he had the presence of mind to go to the kitchen and get the
cookie he had promised his daughter and bring it back to the car for her.
The court also relied on the testimony of the other doctor that Serrato
did not possess all of the symptoms associated with PTSD.
172
On appeal, Serrato argued that his lack of diligence in discovering
the PTSD, and consequent failure to plead insanity initially, was a result
first recognized by the American Psychiatric Association in October, 1980. See supra note 14
and accompanying text.
169. Serrato was picked up by the police that afternoon. He waived his rights and was then
questioned for approximately four hours before he was formally arrested. Serrato had not
confessed at the time he was arrested. He was transferred to the State Police Department the
next day and was again interrogated. The state's and Serrato's stories differ at this point, but
certain facts are consistent. Serrato fainted sometime during questioning the second day. Ad-
ditionally, he had requested an attorney. Although one was eventually called from the Indi-
gent Defender Board, the questioning apparently continued prior to the attorney's arrival.
When an attorney from the Board did arrive, he was delayed at the station for more than one-
half hour before being directed to the detective's annex. At the detective's annex, the detec-
tives claimed that the attorney was drunk and refused to let him see Serrato. The attorney
then called his wife, also an attorney, to come down and talk to Serrato. She was permitted to
see the defendant but noticed that conversation could be overheard through the walls of the
interview room. Serrato, 424 So. 2d at 217-19.
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the trial court's determination that the confes-
sion was voluntary was not unsupported by the evidence. Id. at 222. Justice Dennis dissented
on the issue of the confession, finding it to be the product of Serrato's illegal arrest. Id. at 225
(Dennis, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 216.
171. Id. at 222.
172. Id. at 224. The presence of all possible symptoms is not required for a diagnosis of
PTSD. DSM III, supra note 14, at 238. Dr. Ritter testified that Serrato did not have any
memory impairment or trouble concentrating and that he had not avoided any activities that
could cause recollection of the traumatic event or exposure to events that resembled the trau-
matic event. Id. at 224. However, there was evidence that Serrato suffered from constant
memories of the war, flashbacks and dreams, exaggerated startle responses, and feelings of
alienation from society. Id. at 223 n.9. Yet, the court appears to have concluded that as
Serrato did not exhibit all the symptoms of PTSD, his evidence was lacking. The court was
also quite concerned that there had been no independent verification of Serrato's Vietnam
experiences. Id. at 224. Yet, this is one of the problems inherent in a diagnosis of PTSD-
such verification is not always possible. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
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of the disorder itself.'7 3 One doctor testified that "one of the classic
symptoms of this disorder is the denial of its symptoms."' 74 Neverthe-
less, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Serrato's conviction and the
denial of his motion for a new trial,'75 relying upon the trial court's find-
ing that the PTSD evidence would not have changed the verdict.
176
The defendant in Scarborough v. United States'77 found himself in a
predicament similar to that of both Stone and Serrato. Prior to 1980,
Scarborough was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for assaulting a
postal employee.17 8 In 1981, he filed a motion to vacate his sentence
asserting newly discovered evidence of his insanity based upon a recent
diagnosis of PTSD and exposure to Agent Orange. 1 79 The court denied
Scarborough's motion on the grounds that: (1) he had not plead insanity
at the time of trial; (2) a competency hearing prior to trial found him
mentally competent to stand trial; 180 and (3) he knew of a 1969 medical
report which had recommended his discharge from the service due to an
anxiety reaction, 181 yet he failed to raise the issue at trial.' 2 Therefore,
the defendant was deemed to have waived an insanity defense.'8 3 The
court noted that the new evaluation did nothing more than describe the
same anxiety reactions as the 1969 report.'8 4
The Scarborough court made the same error as the Stone and Ser-
rato courts. It did not recognize that a difference in diagnosis based upon
173. Serrato, 424 So. 2d at 223.
174. Id. DSM III does not include this as a symptom of PTSD. DSM III, supra note 14, at
236-38.
175. 424 So. 2d at 225.
176. Id. at 223-24. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
177. 683 F.2d 1323 (11th Cir. 1982).
178. Id. at 1324. Scarborough pleaded guilty on March 31, 1978. He later attempted to
withdraw his guilty plea but was unsuccessful. Id. at 1324-25.
179. The motion was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which provides that a prisoner in
custody may move the court to vacate the judgment through a collateral attack on the sentence
imposed, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982), and was styled in the form of a Writ of Error Coram Nobis,
a common law writ to correct a judgment on an error of fact when the fact is unknown at the
time of judgment and when the fact would have changed the judgment, provided the fact could
not have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The basis of the motion was that
newly discovered evidence of PTSD showed that the defendant was insane at the time he
committed the crime and entered the guilty plea. Scarborough, 683 F.2d at 1324.
180. The district court initially ordered that Scarborough be examined by a doctor to deter-
mine if he was competent to stand trial. When the doctor's report declared him competent, he
pleaded guilty. Id. at 1324-25.
181. Scarborough was given a medical discharge from the Army in 1969 as a result of an




184. Id. The exact nature of Scarborough's symptoms is not provided in the opinion.
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the same symptoms can mean the difference between legal sanity and
legal insanity.' The fact that the symptoms are the same or similar is
not determinative since each mental illness has factors which are
unique."' If the new diagnosis presents the possibility that the defendant
may have been legally insane, and the diagnosis could not have been
made at the time of the original trial or plea, the defendant truly does
have new evidence and should be granted a new trial.
C. PTSD as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing
In a few cases, defendants have successfully argued that their PTSD
should be considered in sentencing. 187 In other instances, however, de-
fendants' arguments have been to no avail. 188 In cases where the defend-
ants have been successful, the PTSD does not really appear to be the
reason for the reduced sentences. Rather, it seems to be based on the
nature of the crime and the defendant's success in rehabilitation. 8 9
In State v. Watson, 190 the defendant was convicted of second-degree
murder in the death of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment.' 91
He appealed his sentence on the ground that his mental condition had
not been considered as a mitigating factor. 192
Watson murdered his wife when she attempted to move out of their
home. He testified that his wife held a gun on him saying, "[y]ou are not
going to hit me again." A struggle ensued and Watson gained possession
of the gun. The physical evidence showed that he shot his wife repeat-
edly as she crawled from room to room attempting to escape. When the
gun was empty, he reloaded and continued to shoot her.
193
At trial, Watson introduced evidence that he was suffering from
PTSD and that in 1967, following an acute psychotic episode while he
185. See generally Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, in READING IN LAW
AND PSYCHIATRY 217 (rev. ed. 1975); see infra note 227 and accompanying text.
186. See generally DSM III, supra note 14.
187. See infra text accompanying notes 204-07 & 213-15.
188. See infra text accompanying notes 196-98.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 216-20.
190. 311 N.C. 252, 316 S.E.2d 293 (1984).
191. 316 S.E.2d at 295, 297.
192. He did not appeal the conviction. Id. at 295. Watson also argued that the trial judge
erred in finding as an aggravating factor that the crime was particularly heinous, atrocious or
cruel and that this factor was not established by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Watson
further claimed that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors, and that the
judge erred in not finding as a mitigating factor that his wife's leaving him provided strong
provocation for his actions. Id. at 297.
193. Id. at 295. Ten bullets were found in Ann Watson's body and there were blood stains
in several rooms of the house. Id.
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was serving in the Marine Corps, he was diagnosed as suffering from
schizophrenia.194 A forensic psychiatrist testified on Watson's behalf
that although Watson had recovered from the acute psychotic episode,
his judgment, perceptions, feelings, awareness and possibly his intentions
were still affected by a residual reaction or post-traumatic stress disor-
der. 195 The state's rebuttal expert testified that Watson was not suffering
from PTSD and no evidence was introduced that the defendant had been
treated for any mental illness following his return from Vietnam.196
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that since the evidence
of Watson's mental condition was conflicting and inconclusive as to any
connection between Watson's mental condition and the murder, the trial
court was not required to find that the defendant had proved the exist-
ence of a mental condition by a preponderance of the evidence.'97 Thus,
the supreme court affirmed the sentence of life imprisonment. 198 It
should be noted that the court did not hold that PTSD would not be a
mitigating factor, but rather that the defendant's evidence was insuffi-
cient to establish that he suffered from PTSD.199
In contrast to Watson, the defendant in State v. Spawr2 °° was far
more successful in asserting PTSD as a mitigating factor. Spawr became
involved in an argument with another patron in a restaurant; he left the
restaurant and went to his car to retrieve his gun.20' He then returned to
the restaurant and confronted the man again. When the other man
grabbed him, a scuffle ensued in which Spawr was shot in the arm and
the other man was shot in the chest. Both recovered.2 °2 Immediately
after the incident, Spawr sought treatment at the Veterans Administra-
tion because he was thoroughly shaken, disturbed and remorseful over
194. Id. at 296.
195. Id. Watson was treated in 1967, while in the Marines, "because he was preoccupied
with a hatred and fear of all 'slant eyed people.'" He also claimed that since returning from
Vietnam he had been afraid of shooting, even though he had qualified as a sharpshooter in the
Marine Corps. It was Dr. Smith's theory that Watson's dispute with his wife was a reoccur-
rence of the original trauma. Id.
196. Id. at 295. Dr. Rollins testified for the prosecution that when he examined Watson,
the defendant had told him, "'I don't think [combat in Vietnam] affected me that much; I was
about the same as before. I got them to pull me out because of my feet.'" Id. at 296. Yet, the
fact that Watson had been diagnosed as schizophrenic does raise a question whether it was a
misdiagnosis of PTSD. See supra notes 24 & 29 and accompanying text.
197. Id. at 296.
198. Id. at 297.
199. Id. at 296.
200. 653 S.W.2d 404 (Tenn. 1983).
201. Id. Spawr testified that he had his gun in the car because he had recently been target
shooting. Id.
202. Id. at 404-05.
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his conduct. He was diagnosed as suffering from PTSD and began treat-
ment in an "Anger Management Stress Program."2 3
Spawr was convicted of attempted assault.2 4 At his sentencing
hearing, he presented much evidence as to his progress in the stress pro-
gram20 5 and requested a suspended sentence.206 However, he was sen-
tenced to one year in prison. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court
remanded, stating that the defendant should be granted probation if his
rehabilitation was determined to be successful.
20 7
The defendant in United States v. Krutschewski2" 8 was also far more
successful than Watson in using PTSD as a mitigating factor. Krut-
schewski was convicted of importation and distribution of marijuana and
was initially sentenced to ten years and a maximum fine of $60,000.209
At trial, his defense, which was based on PTSD, was rejected.210 Follow-
ing sentencing, he moved for an alternative sentence of community ser-
vice and establishment of a charitable trust fund.211 The court rejected
his proposal as not having a strong enough deterrent effect and upheld
the sentence.212
203. Id. at 405-06. Dr. Jaremko, a consultant to the veteran's center Vietnam rehabilitation
program, testified at length as to why there were so many cases of PTSD arising from the
Vietnam War as well as to what PTSD is and how it is treated. Id. The court included much
of this testimony in its opinion, which is some indication that the court was influenced by the
fact that the defendant was a Vietnam veteran suffering from PTSD.
204. Id. at 404. The defendant was indicted for assault with intent to commit murder but
pleaded guilty to an attempt to commit the crime charged. Id.
205. Dr. Jaremko testified that the defendant was "'one of the most successful individuals
[he'd] ever treated'" and that "'he [had] made remarkable strides in the treatment.'" Id. at
406. Several persons connected with the program testified that Spawr had been very faithful in
his attendance and was making excellent progress. Id.
206. Id. at 404. Dr. Jaremko also testified that prison would be detrimental to Spawr in
that although he was making good progress in treatment, he still required counseling for one to
two more years. The doctor felt that prison would probably deteriorate the values that the
counseling program had helped Spawr to reconstruct. Id. at 406.
207. Id. In remanding, the court noted that Spawr had been out on bond for two years
since the incident and that the trial court had failed to consider Spawr's good faith efforts to
rehabilitate himself. Id.
208. 541 F. Supp. 142 (D. Mass. 1982).
209. United States v. Krutschewski, 509 F. Supp. 1186, 1187 (D. Mass. 1981).
210. Id. at 1188. No information is given in either case as to the basis for Krutschewski's
PTSD defense.
211. Krutschewski, 509 F. Supp. at 1187. The defendant had formed a petroleum corpora-
tion with the proceeds of his drug smuggling and had successfully invested in oil leases that
projected a return of $1,700,000 over the next four yars. Id. at 1188-89.
212. Id. at 1191. Although the court declared that it would not consider any alternative
sentence that would allow Krutschewski to enjoy the proceeds of his illegal activities, it was
not entirely adverse to the possibility of an alternative sentence. The court noted that it had
received many communications supporting Krutschewski's request for leniency, including a
"most astonishing one... from the psychiatrist who testified for the government on the 'Viet-
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Krutschewski filed a second motion,213 again requesting a reduction
of sentence based on his rehabilitation and also requesting that, in the
alternative, his sentence be placed under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 4205(b)(2), which would permit the parole commission to consider
parole at any time.z14 The court granted the alternative request and
placed the defendant's sentence under the provisions of the statute.
Although it was unwilling to extend more special consideration to the
defendant than it already had by placing him under section 4205(b)(2),
the court noted that "[i]t may well be that special consideration should
be given to war veterans who have made great sacrifices for their coun-
try.... [I]t should be a matter of national policy, not randomly case by
case."
215
The difference between Watson's failure and Spawr and Krutschew-
ski's success in using PTSD as a mitigating factor appears to relate more
to the nature of the crime itself and the individual defendant's success at
rehabilitation than to the court's acceptance of the PTSD defense. Wat-
son killed his wife in a particularly cruel and brutal manner.216 Spawr's
victim, on the other hand, recovered. In addition, Spawr was extremely
shaken over the incident, pleaded guilty and immediately sought counsel-
ing.217 Watson offered no evidence that he had received any sort of treat-
ment for his mental disorder following his release from the service.218 In
Krutschewski, the defendant had committed a non-violent crime (drug
smuggling) and had ceased all smuggling activity five years before his
indictment. Additionally, he had become a respected businessman and
civic leader.219 The Krutschewski court noted that although special con-
sideration should perhaps be given to war veterans, it would not do so on
an individual case basis.220 Thus, it appears that a defendant's success or
narn Syndrome' issue." Id. at 1188. At Krutschewski's second hearing, an amicus brief was
submitted by Vietnam Veterans of America, Inc. Krutschewski, 541 F. Supp. at 143.
213. Krutschewski, 541 F. Supp. at 142.
214. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) states:
(b) Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court having jurisdiction to impose
sentence, when in its opinion the ends of justice and best interest of the public require
that the defendant be sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, ....
(2) the court may fix the maximum sentence of imprisonment to be served in which
event the court may specify that the prisoner may be released on parole at such time
as the Commission may determine.
18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (1982).
215. Krutschewski, 541 F. Supp. at 143.
216. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
218. See supra text accompanying note 196.
219. Krutschewski, 509 F. Supp. at 1188. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
220. 541 F. Supp. at 143. See supra text accompanying note 215.
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failure in obtaining a reduced sentence has very little to do with the issue
of PTSD.
A fourth case, which does not fall under either of the extremes of
the other three, is State v. Pettit.2 2 1 In Pettit, the defendant pleaded
guilty to second-degree murder in the killing of his wife.222 He was sen-
tenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years. The defen-
dant appealed, claiming that the sentence was excessive because sufficient
rehabilitation programs were not available to him in prison. Pettit had
presented evidence at the sentencing hearing that he suffered from alco-
hol abuse, a passive-aggressive personality and PTSD.223
The court stated that in its view, the facts supported a minimum
term of confinement of five years and therefore, the indeterminate twenty
year sentence was not excessive. The court also noted that the sentencing
judge had taken full account of these mitigating factors.224 The court of
appeals of Idaho affirmed, deferring to the trial court's finding that suffi-
cient treatment programs would be available to the defendant.225  No
mention was ever made of precisely what treatment was available.
The trial court in Pettit, however, did apparently consider the de-
fendant's mental condition as a mitigating factor. In pointing out that
the sentence could very well be viewed as lenient, the appeals court noted
that in Idaho, indeterminate life sentences have been imposed for second-
degree murder and upheld on appeal.
226
221. 104 Idaho 601, 661 P.2d 767 (Idaho App. 1983).
222. Id. at 602, 661 P.2d at 768. Pettit and his wife had been having marital problems. A
few days before the murder they had a heated argument which culminated in Pettit hitting his
wife and damaging numerous household furnishings. On the day of the murder, Pettit became
extremely intoxicated and then shot his wife in the head. He called the police and reported the
killing himself. Id.
223. The psychiatrists who examined Pettit determined that he did not display any mental
condition which would preclude responsibility. Evidence was introduced that showed Pettit
had a troubled childhood and had been an abused child. The diagnosis of PTSD was not
unanimous and no facts concerning the reason for the diagnosis are given in the opinion. Id. at
602-03, 661 P.2d at 768-69.
224. Id. at 603-04, 661 P.2d at 769. In determining that the sentence was not excessive, the
court considered all three purposes of punishment: retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation.
The court stated that society has a legitimate interest in retribution for such a tragic and
senseless crime and that deterrence alone is a sufficient justification for imposing a prison sen-
tence. Although the court noted that rehabilitation is also a valid purpose, which is sometimes
thwarted by imprisonment, and that Pettit's PTSD claim warranted further clinical evaluation,
it accepted the trial judge's opinion that sufficient treatment would be available to Pettit in
prison. Id. at 603, 661 P.2d at 769.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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D. Misuse of PTSD in Criminal Proceedings
1. Fabricated defenses
Unfortunately for defendants who truly do suffer from PTSD, it
seems to be an easy defense to fabricate.227 Once it is known that some
defendants are asserting the disorder simply because it is new and conve-
nient or because they think service in Vietnam will excuse their criminal
behavior, it is not surprising if courts become skeptical.
A prime example of a faked PTSD defense is People v. Lockett.228
In Lockett, the defendant was charged with eighteen counts of robbery.
He pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity based on PTSD. As the state
had the burden of proof on the sanity issue, the people conceded they
could not disprove the defendant's claim and accepted his plea.229 How-
ever, after accepting the plea, the prosecution was able to obtain Lock-
ett's military records and discovered that he had never been in Vietnam.
His entire service career was spent at Randolph Air Force Base in Texas
as an accounting clerk.23 0 The truly frightening aspect of Lockett is that
prior to the discovery of the defendant's fraud, he had been examined by
several psychiatrists and repeatedly diagnosed as suffering from
227. Walker & Cavenar, supra note 25, at 176. Because of the similarities between PTSD
and antisocial personality disorder, it is quite possible for a person with antisocial personality
disorder to fake PTSD. Id. It is critical that the two be distinguished in that personality
disorders are not generally considered to be "mental illness," particularly in a legal context.
"Antisocial personality" is merely the newest term for sociopath. Sadoff, Basic Facts about
Mental Illness, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 163, 171 (P. Friedman,
ed. 1979).
Another reason PTSD is easy to simulate is that the diagnosis depends upon the veteran's
own report of his symptoms and assumes that he is being truthful. Raifman, Problems of
Diagnosis and Legal Causation in Courtroom Use of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 1 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 115, 121 (1983). To further complicate matters, brochures listing the symptoms of
PTSD have been distributed to veterans by national service organizations and outreach cen-
ters. Atkinson & Henderson, supra note 27, at 1119. "Rarely before have many claimants
presented themselves to psychiatric examiners having read printed symptom checklists
describing diagnostic features of the disorder [they are claiming]." Id. Thus, a thorough ex-
amination and history are critical to an accurate diagnosis. See Walker, supra note 28, at 1385;
Lipkin, supra note 14, at 56, for recommendations on proper diagnostic procedure for PTSD
cases. Objective documentation of the veteran's military history is also highly recommended.
Lipkin, supra note 14, at 64-65; see infra text accompanying notes 228-31.
228. 121 Misc. 2d 549, 468 N.Y.S.2d 802 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
229. Id. at 550, 468 N.Y.S.2d 804. On the issue of sanity, the party who bears the burden of
proof and the quantum of proof necessary, varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. New York
follows a modified version of the rule in M'Naghten's Case: the burden is on the prosecution to
prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. HEARING TRANscnrPT, supra note
103, at 43, exhibit 1. As a general rule, if the burden is on the defendant, the standard is by a
preponderance of the evidence; if the burden is on the state, the standard is beyond a reason-
able doubt. See HEARING TRANsCRIPT, supra note 103, at 43, exhibit 1.
230. Lockett, 121 Misc. 2d at 553, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
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PTSD.231
In State v. Simonson,2 32 the defendant was equally unsuccessful in
his attempt to misuse PTSD. Simonson was convicted of two counts of
first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder for shooting sev-
eral co-workers. 233 Although the defendant pleaded not guilty by reason
of insanity based on PTSD and exposure to Agent Orange, the state was
able to introduce evidence that Simonson had bragged to his friends that
he could do anything he wanted and get away with it because he had
been in Vietiiam and exposed to Agent Orange.234 Fortunately, the de-
fendant was wrong; he was convicted. However, it is interesting to spec-
ulate what would have happened if he hadn't been so foolish as to
advertise his intentions-he truly had been in Vietnam and two psychol-
ogists who worked with Vietnam veterans testified that he was suffering
from PTSD.235
2. PTSD is easier to use than traditional mental illness defenses
PTSD could well be a mecca for criminal defendants. Dissociative
disorders have long been a common basis for an insanity defense; yet,
dissociative disorders themselves are fairly rare.236 This may, to a certain
231. The defendant was examined by six different psychiatrists. Two doctors found Lockett
incompetent to stand trial and both a defense and a prosecution psychiatrist diagnosed him as
suffering from PTSD. Id. at 551-52, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 804-05.
232. 100 N.M. 297, 669 P.2d 1092 (1983).
233. Id. at 298, 669 P.2d at 1093. On the night of the shootings, Simonson left work early
complaining that he was ill. He returned with a shotgun and a pistol approximately two and
one half hours later. After telling a co-worker (Killingsworth) "'I'm going to kill
Maruch, ... and I'll have to shoot Howard, too, because Howard will be a witness and I can't
have no witness,'" Simonson climbed out of his truck and started firing. Maruch was
wounded and two other workers were killed. Id. at 298-99, 669 P.2d at 1093-94 (omission in
the original).
234. Id. at 299, 669 P.2d at 1095, 1097. The state's expert, Dr. Engleman, testified that one
of Simonson's co-workers, Killingsworth, had told him that Simonson had made these state-
ments. The testimony was stricken as hearsay. Id. at 300-01, 669 P.2d at 1095-96. However,
another co-worker of Simonson's testified that Simonson had made similar statements to him.
This testimony was admitted. Id. at 302, 669 P.2d at 1097.
235. Id. Although it is possible that the psychologists were correct about Simonson suffer-
ing from PTSD, it is quite obvious that the murders and the defense were premeditated. It is
possible that Simonson had PTSD which exhibited itself in antisocial behavior. See supra text
accompanying note 19. However, he might also simply have been a sociopath. See supra note
227 and accompanying text. In either event, it is evident that Simonson did not fit any defini-
tion of legal insanity.
236. Cleary, Dissociative States-Disproportionate Use as a Defense in Criminal Proceedings, 4
AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 157, 157 (1983) ("Dissociative disorders, or, hysterical neuro-
ses, dissociative type, rarely seen in clinical practice, appear to be diagnosed with some fre-
quency in criminal defendants, particularly in those charged with homicide.").
PTSD is not a dissociative disorder but an anxiety disorder. DSM III, supra note 14, at
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extent, account for the infrequent success of insanity defenses.23 7 But
PTSD is not rare,23 and neither are criminal defendants who are Viet-
nam veterans.23 9 Thus, PTSD may present an insanity defense which is
more believable and which may be easier to prove in a legal context.
PTSD, unlike other disorders, does not require a predisposition to mental
illness,' 4 and also unlike other disorders, allows the defendant to intro-
duce evidence concerning the development of the disorder that is under-
standable to a jury. Rather than being subjected to large amounts of
technical information, medical terms and theories, the jury will be able to
hear about a specific incident in the defendant's life which was the cause
of his problems.24 The defendant may also be able to introduce testi-
mony from his family and friends concerning the changes in his personal-
ity since his return from Vietnam-testimony designed to evoke
sympathy from a jury.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO PRESENT PRACTICES
PTSD presents a moral as well as a legal problem. If a Vietnam
veteran is committing crimes because of a mental illness which is a result
of his service in Vietnam, then society has a moral responsibility to assist
the veteran. Thus far, much has been done following the recognition of
PTSD. The Veterans Administration has set up counseling and treat-
ment programs, and storefront counseling centers have been opened na-
tionwide.242 These programs, however, help only the veteran who is not
incarcerated. What of the veteran already in prison or already engaged
in criminal conduct? Can we as a nation afford to forget him? A middle
18. However, the dissociative states sometimes found in PTSD are the same as dissociative
states found in dissociative disorders. Id. at 236.
237. REPORT, supra note 90, at 14-15 (1983). ("The Commission concludes... that the
insanity defense trial is an extremely rare event and a successful insanity defense is even more
rare.")
238. It has been estimated that 500,000 to 700,000 Vietnam combat veterans suffer from
PTSD. Walker, supra note 28, at 1385. See supra text accompanying note 34.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
240. Lipkin, supra note 14, at 53. PTSD is a break with classic psychoanalytical thinking
because a diagnosis of PTSD does not require that the person have an underlying predisposi-
tion to mental illness. Id.
241. Milstein & Snyder, The War is Over, The Battle Goes On, TRIAL, Jan. 1983, at 86, 86-
87; Erlinder, supra note 7, at 38. A judge or jury is more likely to identify with a specific event
that caused the defendant's problems than with the technical language and uncertain causes
often found in testimony concerning mental illness.
242. There are currently approximately 150 "vet centers" across the nation for counseling
veterans with PTSD. Another 52 have been funded and are scheduled to open soon. Tele-
phone interview with Bruce Pentland, Social Work Associate, Veterans Administration, Brent-
wood, Cal. (May 1985).
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ground is needed which lies somewhere between abandoning those for
whom the help came too late and bending the laws of criminal responsi-
bility beyond recognition.
California has taken a step toward finding this middle ground by
enacting Penal Code section 1170.9.243 Section 1170.9 allows a convicted
Vietnam veteran who suffers from a drug abuse or mental problem to be
transferred to a federal prison for treatment.2" Enacted in 1982, section
1170.9 is the result of a request by Judge Duane Martin of the San Joa-
quin Superior Court.2 45 The stated purpose of the bill is "to provide help
not available in state prison to Vietnam veterans suffering from their mil-
itary experience.""
The statute is an excellent start. It recognizes that many veterans
need help that cannot be obtained in state prisons and differentiates those
veterans from the rest of the criminal population. However, the statute is
limited, first, in that it is one state's solution to a national problem and,
second, in that it is dependent upon the agreement of the federal govern-
ment. The federal government has not made an express commitment to
receiving these veterans and the success of section 1170.9 depends upon
its cooperation. As long as the federal prisons are free to accept or reject
a California veteran, the solution will remain tentative. Should a federal
facility refuse a veteran prisoner, he must remain in state prison. This is
not a particularly desirable result if his crime is a result of a mental disor-
der which was insufficient to sustain a plea of insanity under California's
243. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.9 (West Supp. 1985).
244. California Penal Code § 1170.9 states:
In the case of any person convicted of a felony who would otherwise be sen-
tenced to state prison the court shall consider whether the defendant was a member
of the military forces of the United States who served in combat in Vietnam and who
suffers from substance abuse or psychological problems resulting from that service.
If the court concludes that the defendant is such a person, the court may order the
defendant committed to the custody of federal corrections officials for incarceration
for a term equivalent to that which the defendant would have served in state prison.
The court may make such a commitment only if the defendant agrees to such a
commitment, the court has determined that appropriate federal programs exist, and
federal law authorizes the receipt of the defendant under such conditions.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.9 (West Supp. 1985).
245. SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, VIETNAM VETERANS-TRANSFER TO FEDERAL
PRISON, AB 2989, Reg. Sess. (1981-82). Judge Martin stated:
[T]here is, at present, no federal help available and no meaningful state help either
for [convicted veterans suffering combat related psychological disability] .... All I
ask... is that Congress [and the Legislature] give opportunities to judges like myself
to divert [veterans] out of the state prison system to the federal system so that [they]
can be transferred to a more humane confinement and receive the type of counseling
[they need]. If we can confine the Watergate prisoners and Patty Hearst in less




strict M'Naghten rule.247 Under the federal program he would have re-
ceived treatment. Under a successful insanity plea he would have re-
ceived treatment. But under these circumstances he receives only a
prison sentence.
Additionally, if more states were to follow California's lead, the fed-
eral prisons would soon become overloaded with state prisoners. This
would either necessitate the refusal of further state prisoners or com-
pletely undermine the effectiveness of available treatment programs.
Thus, one possible solution is for treatment to be offered in all prisons.
As Vietnam veterans suffering from PTSD developed the disorder as
a result of service to their country, it is incumbent upon their country, on
a national level, to assist them. Although federal prisons cannot possibly
house all prisoners who are Vietnam veterans, other possibilities are
available.
Veterans Administration counseling programs could be instituted in
all prisons. Although this is being accomplished in some places, it is not
actually authorized by the Vet Centers' enabling legislation.24 A pro-
gram within the prisons would allow veterans serving time to receive the
help necessary for their successful return to society. These are the truly
forgotten veterans. By the time many are released the present PTSD
programs will have expired.249 These vets will once again be on the
outside, with the same problems, yet without help.
A second possible solution is the development of a more uniform
and systematic application of PTSD as a sentencing factor. If the veteran
is eligible for any sort of alternative sentencing, treatment opportunities
should be considered. Many veterans will not otherwise receive treat-
ment. Although all prisons provide for the transfer of mentally ill pris-
oners to state hospitals, the resources are limited25° and most veterans
will never be transferred.251
247. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
248. Veteran's Health Care Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-22, 93 Stat. 47 (1979).
Because the legislation does not authorize the vet centers to go into the prisons, such action
could jeopardize the rest of the program by exceeding what Congress has authorized. The
Veterans Administration in Brentwood, California, however, does have about 20 programs in
15 different correctional facilities in California. This program is well known and not con-
nected with the vet centers. Telephone conversation with Bruce Pentland, supra note 242; see
also Erlinder, supra note 7, at 47.
249. The current vet center program was originally scheduled to expire in September 1984.
It has been extended through 1988. Telephone conversation with Bruce Pentland, supra note
242. By 1988, the program will have been in existence for eight and one half years. Congress
may or may not extend the program for an additional period of time.
250. REPORT, supra note 90, at 27; see also 18 U.S.C. 4241 (1982).
251. Even defendants who are found "guilty but mentally ill," under the new verdict in use
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A third possible solution is a reexamination of the rules applicable
to the granting of a new trial based on the discovery of new evidence,
when such evidence is a recent diagnosis of PTSD. A veteran who is
diagnosed as having PTSD is in a vastly different position as far as crimi-
nal responsibility than one who is diagnosed as having a personality dis-
order. Personality disorders are not considered to be the type of mental
illness which can excuse legal responsibility or even be considered as a
mitigating factor.252 This is not to suggest that every veteran who finds a
doctor who will diagnose PTSD should be granted a new trial. But if
sufficient evidence of PTSD is presented by mental health experts who
are experienced in dealing with the disorder, the veteran's claim should
not be dismissed on the grounds that he waived an insanity defense or
that he knew before trial that he had problems. His claim should be fully
evaluated to determine whether the veteran has a meritorious defense.
Procedural rules should not be permitted to bar a defense which was
unavailable at the time of trial. As PTSD could not have been diagnosed
prior to 1980, it is unique among mental illnesses. This is as much new
evidence as the proverbial death bed confession of the true criminal.
I
VII. CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined PTSD in Vietnam veterans: Its possi-
ble causes and manifestations, and its uses in a criminal law context.
Although studies to date are very limited, and conclusive data does not
yet exist to directly link PTSD to criminal conduct, present statistics do
show an inordinate number of Vietnam veterans in the American crimi-
nal justice system. This Comment has examined the three most preva-
lent ways that PTSD comes into play in the criminal justice system-as
the basis of a defense, as grounds for a new trial, and as a mitigating
factor in sentencing-and has concluded that its use by criminal defend-
ants is fraught with peril. PTSD is both easy to use in a criminal context
and difficult to fit into existing legal molds. The disorder's causes and
symptoms, even its very nature, are likely to evoke strong emotions from
judge and jury-emotions which may or may not be the ones the defend-
ant is seeking to evoke.
PTSD in Vietnam veterans, unlike other mental disorders, is not the
problem of the individual defendant, but the problem of the nation and
as such, it demands attention. Therefore, .this Comment urges a more
in several states, do not necessarily receive treatment, but rather often find themselves "just
another inmate." Slovenko, Commentaries on Psychiatry and Law: "Guilty But Mentally 111,"
10 J. OF PSYCH. & LAW, 541, 546 (1982).
252. Sadoff, supra note 227 at 171.
VIETNAM STRESS SYNDROME
uniform approach to dealing with PTSD in criminal trials. Courts and
legislatures alike must be educated as to the realities of PTSD. Individ-
ual misconceptions and prejudices should not be permitted to affect de-
fendants' chances of receiving a fair trial and adequate treatment, while
those who do not suffer from -PTSD or whose PTSD is not related to
their criminal conduct should not be able to escape punishment because
they were able to fabricate a defense.
Elizabeth J. Delgado*
* The author is especially grateful to Judy Hecht Iturriaga, Ph.D. for her assistance in
preparing this Comment.
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